The relationship between the costs of coalitionary behavior and the evolution of such behavior has not been closely examined by theoretical studies. Here, we create a set of life-history models for species whose coalitionary behavior is genetically determined to investigate how different types of costs afflicted upon members of failed coalitions, in terms of survival, fecundity, and social rank, may influence the nature of coalitionary behavior that emerges at evolutionary equilibrium. We also extend previous theory by examining the coevolution between coalitionary behavior and concessions granted by dominant individuals to prevent dominants from being targeted by coalitions. We show that species that form coalitions to contest social rank evolve to regularly form bridging coalitions under a vast majority of social and ecological settings, whereas species that contest fecundity form all-up coalitions under most conditions. Further, dominant individuals concede resources to subordinates to prevent coalitionary attacks only in very few circumstances, and these concessions occur only to ensure another individual is a more attractive coalition target. We compare and contrast results to empirical data to provide an evolutionary context for commonly observed coalitionary behaviors in the animal kingdom.
INTRODUCTION
In behavioral ecology, coalitions generally refer to two or more individuals that temporarily cooperate in joint action against a third party (Pandit and van Schaik 2003) . This widespread and complex phenomenon has been thoroughly studied by a large number of game theoretical models (for review, see Mesterton-Gibbons et al. 2011 ). However, a recent comprehensive comparison (Bissonnette et al. 2015) between these models and a vast amount of data collected by field biologists reveals an important lack of communication between theorists and empiricists. An aspect of coalitionary behavior that has largely been left unexamined in the theoretical literature is the cost of forming coalitions (Bissonnette et al. 2015) , particularly if the coalitions are unsuccessful. Yet empiricists rely on theoretical models to identify the types of costs related to coalition formation and coalition failure because these costs are frequently intangible, difficult to observe directly (Bissonnette 2009) , and may manifest in a variety of forms (Smith et al. 2010) , such as decreased survival (Bercovitch 1988 , Bissonnette et al. 2014 ) and opportunity costs (e.g., decreased fecundity or rank in the social hierarchy; Barrett and Henzi 2002; Bissonnette et al. 2014) . As has been demonstrated previously (Irwin and Taylor 2001; Lion & Gandon, 2010) , the evolution of certain social behaviors, such as altruism, is largely contingent upon the particular life-history trait (fecundity vs. survival) affected by the behavior. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that different forms of consequences resulting from coalitionary behavior may influence the types of coalitionary behavior (all-up, bridging, and all-down) that evolves.
A second aspect of coalitionary behavior that remains neglected especially by theoretical work is its connection to concessions. It is challenging to study concessions empirically because it is difficult to distinguish between concessions and a dominant's inability to completely control subordinates, although theoretically it has been shown that dominants can evolve to concede to their subordinates and that these concessions have the potential to influence group stability and dynamics. For example, concession models of cooperative breeders have demonstrated that the benefits of group augmentation and philopatry under certain conditions may encourage the dominant to concede fecundity to subordinates in the hopes of retaining them (Kokko and Johnstone 1999) . Whereas theoretically it has been shown (Reeve and Ratnieks, 1993; Cant et al. 2006 ) that under certain conditions it may be favorable for dominant individuals to provide concessions to avoid conflict (i.e., peace incentives, Reeve and Ratnieks 1993) , it is unclear whether and under what conditions dominants evolve to provide concessions in order to prevent coalitions from targeting them. Indeed, some animals, such as lions (Bygott et al. 1979; Packer et al. 2001) , that exhibit coalitionary behavior also engage in lethal competition over resources and, consequently, dominants of such species may provide peace incentives to prevent these costly engagements, which would explain the relatively low reproductive skew found in these species. In species whose coalitionary behavior is governed by simple, genetically determined rules, concessions cannot be used to entice coalition formation because coalitionary behavior does not respond dynamically to concessions; instead, concessions and coalitionary behavior effectively manifest simultaneously. As such, we hypothesized that concessions will not evolve in species that are incapable of sophisticated cognitive ability.
Here, we create a suite of relatively simple models to better understand the influence of certain social and life-history characteristics on the evolution of coalitionary behavior. We use these models to show how different types of costs (i.e., survival, fecundity, and rank changes) affect the types of coalitions (i.e., all-up, all-down, and bridging) that emerge. We also investigate the conditions that facilitate the coevolution between coalition formation and the concessions granted to subordinates by dominant individuals to prevent coalitions among subordinates. Our model provides important general conclusions regarding how simple social and life-history characteristics can influence the types of coalitions that form in species that may use simple rules when forming coalitions-species whose coalitionary behavior has received relatively little attention by both empirical and theoretical studies (Bissonnette et al. 2014 (Bissonnette et al. , 2015 despite being relatively common (Gigenrenzel et al. 2008; Bissonnette et al. 2014) .
MODEL
We follow previous work (Caplow 1956; Mesterton-Gibbons et al. 2011 ) of many coalition models by focusing on triadic interactions in species with strict hierarchies. Consider a large number of territories, each inhabited by a trio consisting of an alpha, beta, and gamma individual (i.e., individuals in the top, middle, and bottom rank of the social hierarchy, respectively). Suppose initially that apart from their positions in social hierarchies this population is homogeneous and that rank is simply determined by the order in which individuals arrive on each territory. Each trio produces a large number of offspring each season, and the alpha individual of each group initially has sole control over the distribution of the group's reproductive opportunities. At the beginning of each season, the alpha allocates portion p of all reproductive opportunities to the beta, and portion q to the gamma, and is left with the remaining portion 1 -p − q for its own use. We assume that these concessions are genetically controlled and may evolve over time. Following the distribution of fecundity, individuals on the territory may choose to form a coalition. Each coalition is comprised of two individuals, and each trio can contain at most one coalition. The individual that is not a member of the coalition is the coalition's target. Three types of coalitions are possible in this model: alphabeta ("all-down"), alpha-gamma ("bridging"), and beta-gamma ("all-up").
Coalition solicitation
We create two sets of models that describe two different types of social dynamics. The first set assumes a specific pattern of coalition solicitation: following Stamatopoulos et al. (2009) , we assume that individuals higher in the hierarchy are socially dominant position and are thus able to prevent the formation of certain coalitions that may target them by first themselves forming a coalition (Figure 1 ). With probability x 1,2 , the alpha first offers the beta the opportunity to form a coalition. We assume that both parties must be willing participants for a coalition to form.
The beta individual accepts the alpha's offer with probability x 2,1 . Should either be unwilling to form the coalition, the alpha next extends the coalition offer to the gamma with probability x 1,3 , and the gamma accepts with probability x 3,1 . If either declines, the beta now gets the opportunity to offer the gamma the opportunity to form a coalition and does so with probability x 2,3 , whereas the gamma accepts with probability x 3,2 . Each of these probabilities is genetically determined and may evolve over time. The loci controlling each phenotype is assumed to be on separate chromosomes, such that these phenotypes evolve independently of one another.
The second set of models assumes a scramble solicitation such that no individual has a social advantage during coalition formation. Let x i c , represent the probability that the individual in rank i is willing to form a coalition. Let x i h , represent the probability that the individual in rank i is willing to form a coalition with the higher ranked individual; with probability 1 , − x i h , the individual is willing to form a coalition with the lower ranked individual. With scramble coalition formation, the probability that an alphabeta coalition will form, for example, is x x x x c c h h 1, 2, 1, 2, . Because individuals in the population are homogeneous apart from rank, we assume the probability that coalitions between individuals i and j succeed is constant, given by c i j , . The assumption that coalition success is rank dependent rather than individual dependent is made of mathematical convenience. Effectively, we assume that although individuals do not vary in intrinsic resource holding potential (RHP), differences in rank may provide individuals with different amounts of resources, information, and motivation (Balshine-Earn et al. 1998 ) that ultimately affects the probability that specific coalitions are successful.
Coalition consequences
Empirical observations suggest that coalitions can form to contest and maintain either tangible resources such as fecundity (nonrankchanging coalitions; Kuester and Paul 1992; Noe 1992) or higher ranks in the hierarchy (rank-changing coalitions; Riss and Goodall 1977; de Villiers et al. 2003; de Waal 1982) . Further, evidence suggests the cost of being a target of a successful coalition or a member of a failed coalition may be in the form of reduced fecundity, lower survival, and/or lowered rank in the hierarchy (Bissonnette et al. 2015) . For each set of models (sequential and scramble solicitation), we create a separate model for each situation: (i) nonrank-changing coalitions with fecundity costs, (ii) nonrank-changing coalitions with survival costs, (iii) rank-changing coalitions with fecundity costs, (iv) rank-changing coalitions with survival costs, and (v) rank-changing coalitions with rank-lowering costs (i.e., members of failed coalitions are assumed to usurped by the target, should the target not already be the residing alpha).
When coalitions form to contest fecundity, a successful coalition will obtain portion h of the target's resources. For example, should an alpha-beta coalition be successful, it is assumed that the gamma individual loses portion h, leaving it with portion (1 )
− h q of all breeding opportunities. This loss in fecundity is divided-not necessarily evenly-between the members of the coalition, with the higher ranked (dominant) individual receiving portion h 1 of the spoils, such that the alpha would receive h hq 1 , in addition to the 1 − − p q that it retained, and the beta would receive an additional (1 ) 1 − h hq. Should the coalition fail, the dominant individual loses portion (1 )
1 − − − h h p q and the beta loses h h p q 1 (1 ) − − , and this is given to the target of the failed coalition. A similar construction was used for survival cost, where the losing party lost portion h of its survival, although the victorious party was not assumed to gained increased survival.
Selection gradient
After coalition formation and the division of fecundity, offspring production occurs. All offspring become floaters that queue for opportunities to join these breeding trios. It is assumed that the reproductive value of all offspring is equal, and the population is at demographic equilibrium (i.e., the population is of constant size), such that the reproductive value of offspring is also equal across seasons. Following reproduction, individuals on breeding territories then have some probability of dying each season. An individual in rank i survives the season with probability s i . Since each trio collectively produces a very large number of offspring, we assume that there is a sufficient number of individuals in queue to join these hierarchies, such that at the beginning of each season, there are always 3 individuals on each territory (Figure 2 ). Hierarchies are determined by the order in which individuals arrive on each territory: individuals who have been on the territory the longest obtain more favorable positions in the hierarchy. Should individuals arrive at the same time, we assume the contest over hierarchy positions is randomly resolved. As relatives tend to form long-term alliances (Pandit and van Schaik 2003) , coalitions are rarely observed among relatives (Kulik et al. 2012 , Bissonnette et al. 2015 , and so we will ignore kinship. All variables in the main text are described in Table 1 .
We demonstrate how to calculate the selection gradient for the scenario with sequential solicitation, nonrank-changing coalitions, and fecundity costs. Analogous calculations can be applied to the remaining models (see Supplementary Data). For each of the models, there are 12 states in which individuals may reside:
To calculate the selection gradient acting on each phenotype, we first derive the future reproductive success associated with each state. We define W i as the future reproductive success for an individual in state i (e.g., W 6 represents the residual fitness of a gamma in a trio that has formed an alpha-gamma coalition). Let F i represent the fecundity of an individual in state i; that is, F i is equal to the number of offspring produced by an individual in state i per season (e.g., F p q 10 = (1 ) − − ). Lastly, let M i j , represent the probability that an individual in state i transitions into state j in the next generation (e.g., in order for an alpha in trio that contains an alpha-beta coalition in one generation to remain the alpha in a trio that contains an alpha-beta coalition in the next generation, it must survive [probability s 1 ] and an alpha-beta coalition must then form [probability x x 1,2 2,1 ]; i.e., M sx x . The solution to these equations is derived analytically using computer software (not shown because of their length). We next use the reproductive success of each state to calculate the fitness of a wild-type individual in a wild-type population. Let I i represent the probability that an individual begins its tenure in a trio in state i (e.g., I s s s x x x x x 10 1 2 3 1 ,2 2,1 1 ,3 3,1 2 ,3
Then the fitness of a wild-type individual is given by W IW
∑ . In this way, we are able to track the lifetime fitness consequences of coalitionary behavior and understand how these consequences vary with respect to life history and social characteristics.
Suppose now a mutant enters this wild-type population and it exhibits deviant behavior with respect to 1 of the 8 Figure 1 Scheme outlining sequential coalition solicitation. The probability of each scenario, which are functions of the trio's phenotypic values, is listed above each error. For example, for alpha-gamma coalitions to occur, the alpha must either not offer the beta a chance to form a coalition or the beta must decline (probability 1 12 21 − x x ), then the alpha must offer the gamma an opportunity to form a coalition and the gamma must accept (probability x x 13 31 ), and thus the probability of alpha-gamma coalition is (1 ) 12 21 13 31
− x x x x . It follows that higher ranked individuals are afforded more opportunities to prevent the formation of coalitions that target them.
Beta in an alpha-beta coalition trio i = 3
Gamma in an alpha-beta coalition trio i = 4
Alpha in an alpha-gamma coalition trio i = 5
Beta in an alpha-gamma coalition trio i = 6
Gamma in an alpha-gamma coalition trio
Alpha in a beta-gamma coalition trio i = 8
Beta in a beta-gamma coalition trio i = 9
Gamma in a beta-gamma coalition trio i = 10
Alpha in a no-coalition trio i = 11
Beta in a no-coalition trio i = 12
Gamma in a no-coalition trio phenotypes under selection; wild-type individuals use strategy s p q x x x x x x = ( , , , , , , , ) 1,2 1,3 2,1 2,3 3,1 3,2 , whereas mutants use a deviant strategy s . We will demonstrate the calculation of the selection gradient acting on a mutant phenotype by considering a mutation in phenotype, x 1,2 . We now seek to calculate the mutant's future reproductive success in each state, W i . Instead of transition probabilities, M i j , , being purely a function of the wild-type phenotypes, s, certain entries will be a function of the mutant gene, s . The entries in which this particular mutation manifests itself are
, , , for all k -the remaining transition probabilities remain the same, because the mutant needs to be in the alpha position for its mutation x 1,2 to potentially influence its reproductive output. We then solve the system of equations to calculate W i . We apply similar changes to the initial state vector, I to get the mutant's initial state vector, I . Putting this together, we derive the expected lifetime fitness of an individual with an x 1,2 mutation. We do this for each phenotype under selection in order to develop the following system of equations:
This system is analytically intractable, but the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) can be derived numerically by following the effect of the selection gradient given in equation (1) in an iterative fashion (Dercole and Rinaldi 2008) . Effectively, under the assumption of weak selection, offspring may have small mutations, and beneficial mutations-changes in phenotypic values that would increase an individual's fitness-emerge and become fixed in the population (Metz et al. 1992) , such that changes in phenotypic values over time are traveling along the selection gradients given by equation (1). Specifically, we change the value of each phenotype by some amount proportional to its selection gradient and repeat until, for each of the phenotypes, the selection gradient approaches 0 or reaches a boundary imposed by the biologically relevant parameter space 0 , , 1
RESULTS

Nonrank-changing coalitions
We first examine coalitionary behavior arranged to contest fecundity, with the costs of failed coalitions shared evenly among members (i.e., h 1 = 0.5). Regardless of whether coalition solicitation is performed sequentially or in a scramble, and regardless of whether the costs of failed coalitions are losses in fecundity or survival, alphas generally evolve never to concede any fecundity to the beta and gamma, and beta-gamma coalitions form in response; in fact, this is always the ESS whenever c c c > > , a condition expected to hold true whenever those higher in the hierarchy have greater success rates in fights-a common although by no means universal trait of animal hierarchies (Bissonnette et al. 2014 ). The exception is if the probability of alpha-gamma coalition success is substantially lower than the probability of beta-gamma coalition success, c c
< , in which case oscillations in the degree of concessions as well as the frequency of beta-gamma and alpha-beta coalitions occur ( Figure 3) ; alphas concede some fecundity to the gamma individual, and consequently, both beta-gamma and alpha-beta coalitions evolve. Note that such cyclic equilibria may be the product of the homogeneous population assumption. Survival rates, as well as the degree of fecundity, lost by failed coalitions and the targets of successful coalitions have no effect on the outcome of evolution. The fact that the relation between c 1,3 and c 2,3 but not the absolute value of c 1,3 perturbs the system from a pure beta-gamma ESS despite not affecting the payoff structure of an beta-gamma equilibrium suggests that the transient dynamics are important to consider. However, it should also be noted that all listed results are not contingent upon initial conditions.
A relatively common feature in some species (Feh 1999 ) is that subordinates bear a greater cost for failed coalitions than do dominants, and dominants receive a greater benefit for successful coalitions than do subordinates (i.e., h 1 < 0.5). As before, all-up coalitions are the ESS whenever c c c < and higher ranked individuals in coalitions receive substantially more than lower ranked individuals ( ) , 0.5 >> > 0 1 h then the alpha evolves to concede some fecundity to the gamma, and although beta-gamma coalitions are still the only coalition type to form, the frequency of this coalition oscillates (Figure 4) . In contrast, if lower ranked The probability that an individual in state i will be in state j in the following season I i,j
Probability that an individual begins in rank j in a trio in state i
Figure 2
Lifecycle of individuals in the model. At the beginning of each generation, there is a triad on each territory. First, the alpha proposes a distribution of resources (assumed to directly translate to fecundity). Coalitions may then form, which can alter this distribution of resources or the ranks of individuals. Next, reproduction based on this adjusted distribution of fecundity occurs, with all offspring dispersing to become floaters. At the end of the breeding season, individuals on each territory may die, in which case it is assumed that floaters fill these vacancies, and thus a triad resides on each territory, and the cycle begins. Note we assume that there are a very large number of territories and that the production of offspring is sufficiently large such that individuals on each territory are unrelated. Note that the population size is unchanging.
individuals in coalitions receive substantially more than higher ranked individuals ( ) , 1> >> 0.5 1 h oscillating levels of betagamma coalitions occur, but the alpha concedes some fecundity to the beta instead. By conceding to the subordinate that receives the greatest penalty as a result of a failed coalition, the alpha is assured to re-obtain a significant portion of these concessions back if the beta-gamma coalition fails, and by making these concessions, the alpha also loses a smaller portion of its fecundity should the coalition succeed.
Rank-changing coalitions
When coalitions are formed with the intent to alter ranks and solicitation occurs sequentially, we once again find that generally alpha individuals evolve to concede nothing to their subordinates; however, alpha-gamma coalitions evolve under a wide range of conditions. There are two exceptions. First, if the survival of beta individuals is significantly less than the survival of gamma individuals, alpha-beta coalitions evolve (although dominant individuals in many species experience greater survival, there are certain species in which dominant individuals suffer greater mortality, Rose 1991; Krams 2001) . Second, if the probability of alpha-gamma coalition success is lower than beta-gamma success, then oscillating levels of beta-gamma and alpha-gamma coalitions evolve.
Alternatively, when coalitions form with scramble solicitation, beta-gamma coalitions evolve unless the survival of beta individuals is low relative to gamma individuals, in which case oscillating levels of alpha-beta coalitions occur.
DISCUSSION
Rank-changing versus nonrank-changing coalitions
Our model provides the general, testable prediction that, among species in which dominants are able to monopolize resources, species that use coalitions to contest rank should be more likely to form alphagamma, or 'bridging' coalitions, compared with species that form coalitions primarily to contest fecundity, in which beta-gamma, or 'all-up' coalitions, should be favored. The fact that under the majority of parameter conditions alpha-gamma coalitions form when social ranks are being contested and sequential solicitation occurs is expected. The gamma can automatically ascend to the beta position by forming an alliance with either the beta or the alpha. Because the only way for the beta to immediately take over the alpha position is to form a coalition with the gamma, the beta is willing to form a coalition with the gamma. As such, the alpha seeks to preempt the opportunity for the beta-gamma coalition to form by themselves forming a coalition with the gamma. With scramble solicitation, the alpha is unable to prevent the beta-gamma coalition, and so beta-gamma coalitions generally evolve. Alternatively, beta-gamma coalitions generally form when fecundity is contested simply because the alpha tends to monopolize resources, and thus there is little for subordinates to lose and much to gain by forming a beta-gamma coalition.
Costs of coalitions
It is difficult to theoretically investigate the costs of coalitionary behavior because technically it requires models that track the fitness consequences of an individual's decisions through its entire life cycle, rather than identifying evolutionarily stable strategies Change in coalition types and concessions over time when the probability of success for alpha-gamma coalitions is lower than that of beta-gamma coalitions. The solid black and blue lines represent concessions granted to the beta and gamma, respectively. The dashed red, blue, and black lines represent the frequency of alpha-beta, alpha-gamma, and beta-gamma coalitions, respectively. The cycle can be described as follows. Alphas have initially evolved to concede to the gamma and in turn alpha-beta coalitions are initially frequent. However, gamma individuals are then receptive to coalition offers from the beta in order to retain their share of fecundity; beta individuals are willing to align with gammas because alphas still retain a larger share of fecundity. Eventually, as beta-gamma coalitions become more frequent, the alpha is gaining less from concessions and so concedes less to the gamma, and soon more alpha-beta coalitions occur coalitions occur. The cycle then repeats. Results were generated using s 1 = 0. . By finding what is rational behavior at each stage of an individual's life cycle in isolation, previous models examine only the immediate, direct fitness consequences of coalitionary behavior rather than the influence of coalitionary behavior on an individual's lifetime fitness. The potential need for thorough life-history models of coalitionary behavior is made further evident by the fact that previous theory has established that in social hierarchies with heritable rank, future benefits and costs may affect current behavior (Kokko and Johnstone 1999; Kokko et al. 2002) . Available data suggest that the time and energy invested in coalition formation is negligible and that injuries and especially death as a consequence of failed coalitions are rare, yet it is unclear whether this is because such events have gone unrecorded or whether they are in fact unusual (Bissonnette et al. 2014 ). There are, however, data to suggest that there may be opportunity costs, including failure to achieve higher ranks, reduced mating access, and various other consequences that can only be addressed with models that capture entire life cycles, associated with coalition formation, particularly if the coalition fails (Bissonnette, 2009 ). Yet our model, which does track the fitness consequences of behavior thorough an individual's entire life cycle, suggests that whether or not coalitions are rank changing is far more influential in affecting the evolution of coalitionary behavior than the types of costs (fecundity vs. survival) experienced by failed coalitions or the targets of successful ones. Future empirical research may benefit from identifying differences in the frequency of types of coalitions that emerge in species that regularly engage in rank-changing coalitions compared with species in which rank changes as a result of coalition formation is rare.
Concessions
Our model predicts that the threat of all-up coalitions may lead high-ranked individuals to concede a greater amount of resources toward lower ranked individuals, without changing ranks, only in a specific set of circumstances. Concessions only occur when alpha-gamma coalitions are unlikely to succeed compared with beta-gamma coalitions, implying (under the assumption that the competitiveness of a coalition is the sum of the competitiveness of its members) that the beta must be more competitive than the alpha for concessions to be granted. In this case, the alpha evolves to concede fecundity to one of the subordinates; which subordinate the dominant concedes to depends on the division of risk and reward between dominants and subordinates in coalitions. In doing so, the subordinate that receives the concession then becomes an excellent target for the coalition, which encourages the remaining subordinate to form a coalition with the alpha. Ultimately, selection never favors alphas that concede to both subordinates; instead, the alpha concedes to only one subordinate. Further, our model suggests that these concessions do not occur so that the subordinate afforded a portion of fecundity will have more to lose and should therefore be less willing to be a part of beta-gamma coalitions, because generally they hold more risk for the beta than alpha-beta coalitions; instead, concessions are made so that the subordinate receiving the concession is a more compelling target for coalitions.
Our work differs from most previous reproductive skew theory because it focuses on the influence of direct aggression rather than the threat of departure of eviction; our work is unique because this aggression is in the form of coalition formation rather than binary conflict (Cant et al. 2006 ). Because our model is triadic, we were able to clearly demonstrate that dominants may be willing to concede fecundity, but we consistently found that this concession is to a single subordinate only. It is thus likely true that should other concession models be extended to 3 or more individuals, one would find that the dominant concessions to subordinates likely follow an uneven distribution, and the amount that each subordinate receives will depend on rank and various other social and ecological factors. For example, dominants likely need to concede less to subordinates in higher rank because they are more likely to inherit breeding territories and therefore need less incentive to remain in the group. We have ignored factors related to ecological constraints that often motivate concessions in models of cooperative breeders, in order to exclusively investigate and precisely describe the relationship between concessions and coalitions.
Comparison with empirical data
A comparison between our results and empirical data yields mixed agreement. In what follows, we explore some of the similarities between our results and empirical observations and provide an evolutionary context for these findings. We also highlight discrepancies between our results and the data, identify possible deficiencies in the available data and limitations of our model, and propose future studies of coalitionary behavior and concessions that may help resolve the disagreement between theory and data. It is difficult to compare our results with previous models and empirical data because the relation between concessions and coalitions has not previously been investigated. Comparisons are particularly problematic for nonrank-changing coalitions because it is unclear whether the social hierarchy as it is recorded by field biologists coincides with the rank as it is imposed in our model or rather the distribution of fecundity-these hierarchies are not necessarily equivalent. Indeed, there are no rank changes in our models if fecundity is contested (aside for succession due to deaths), yet based on the outcome of coalitionary behavior individuals in lower ranks may actually have greater fecundity and thus may appear to be of higher social rank if their coalitions are successful. This stated, we make comparisons where possible.
The frequency of certain types of coalitions is known to vary significantly across (Kulik et al. 2012 ) and within species (Bissonnette et al. 2015) , and our model does suggest that the type of coalitions that evolve may vary with survival, the manner of coalition solicitation, and whether it is social rank or fecundity that is being contested. However, observations indicate that among unrelated individuals, all-down coalitions are the most common form of coalitionary behavior (Harcourt and Stewart 1989) . In contrast, our model suggests that coalitions contesting fecundity should be alldown only when c c 1,3 2 ,3 < , and coalitions contesting rank should be all-down only if the survival of beta individuals is generally much lower than that of gamma individuals ( ) . s s 2 3 << In our model, few conditions favor alpha-beta coalitions because, assuming dominants have control over resource allocation, alpha individuals will naturally evolve to take a greater share of resources, which makes them an excellent target for coalitions. We find this to be true regardless of whether the cost of failed coalitions is survival or fecundity. If the costs and benefits are unequal for individuals within coalitions (i.e., the dominants both gain more and risk less relative to subordinates), no coalitions other than beta--gamma coalitions evolve under any parameter conditions; however, oscillating levels of beta-gamma coalitions evolve, as well as oscillating amounts that alpha individuals concede to the gamma individuals.
Whereas previous studies (Pandit and van Schaik 2003; van Schaik et al. 2006) have assumed that the distribution of fecundity (or whichever limiting resource is being contested) is environmentally determined, here we assume the degree of despotism-at least before the formation of coalitions-is controlled by the dominant individual. The degree to which the dominant individuals in species exhibiting coalitionary behavior are actually able to monopolize resources is of course variable and difficult to determine, as it is often unclear whether subordinates who reproduce are able to do so due to concessions or a lack of control from dominant breeders (CluttonBrock et al. 2001) . At least in certain species, there are high degrees of monopolization which seem to be dominant controlled (Baker and Smuts 1996; Cockburn 1998; Heinsohn et al. 2000) . Our results, in contrast to empirical data, suggest that all-up coalitions should be common under a wide range of parameter conditions, and this may indicate that the type of coalitions that evolve may be related to the ability for the dominant individuals of a species to make concessions, which naturally is contingent upon the ability of dominant individuals to monopolize resources-if dominant individuals are unable to control the distribution of resources, they are unable to make concessions, and thus the results of our models are not applicable. Our models suggest then that the variance in the prevalence of all-down coalitions between species may be due to species-level differences in the ability of dominant individuals to monopolize resources and their willingness to concede resources to subordinates as peace offerings, and this may be a promising direction for future empirical work. Bissonnette et al. (2015) state that their unpublished data reveal allup coalitions are particularly uncommon across species in mixed-sex groups, in which coalitions to contest fecundity are common. They posit that this is likely the result of unequal distribution of mating opportunities among successful coalitions, which is in agreement with the fact that when h 1 in our model deviates significantly from 0.5 (an equal distribution), beta-gamma coalitions are no longer ubiquitous.
All-up, rank-changing coalitions have also been found to be relatively rare, and it has been proposed that this is the result of high costs involved with contesting rank (Bissonnette et al. 2015) . The existence of other types of rank-changing coalitions is often more difficult to prove because they may not result in readily observable changes (e.g., alpha-beta coalitions formed to prevent rank changes are unlikely to produce rank changes). There has, however, been recordings of the alpha male-forming coalitions with lower ranking members to remove higher ranking social threats to the alpha (Jones 2005; Bissonnette et al. 2015) , and this is the very type of coalition (i.e., bridging) our model predicts is most likely to form.
All-down, rank-changing coalitions are fairly common in both primate and non-primate species (Bissonnette et al. 2015) , which is in contrast to our findings that the formation of coalitions among high-ranking individuals to preemptively deter all-up coalitions should be relatively rare. Again, this discrepancy may be the result of the assumption that the alpha is able to control resources, and we expect that the frequency of all-down coalitions should vary with the alpha's ability to monopolize resources. Another possible explanation for the dissimilarities between our model and the data is the fact that our model population has been divided into triads. Although alpha-gamma coalitions evolve in our rankchanging model while all-down coalitions are most common in nature, both of these coalitions can, from the perspective of the alpha, be viewed as rank stabilizing: they are formed so that the alpha can preserve its rank. The reason all-down coalitions may be more prevalent in reality than our model suggests is that in many populations exhibiting coalitionary behavior group sizes are larger than 3 (Bissonnette et al. 2015) , and in such groups, there are a greater number of viable all-up coalitions that can target the alpha and, indeed, the beta. As such, there may be greater incentive for all-down coalitions. Unfortunately, creating models of coalitionary behavior that calculate lifetime fitness consequences become exponentially more complex with larger group sizes, and thus agent-based simulation would likely be required. Models as well as empirical data that are able to describe changes in coalitionary behavior as a function of group size are profitable lines of inquiry for future work.
Other theories for the relative rarity of all-up coalitions include the high cost of targeting dominant individuals, and the fact that all-up coalitions can be countered by all-down coalitions, which often consist of more dominant individuals (Bissonnette et al. 2015 ). Yet our models show that all-up and bridging coalitions can readily emerge even when the probability with which alpha-beta coalitions succeed is much higher than that of other coalitions. This is due to the dominant's general tendency to retain most of the group's fecundity, ensuring that subordinates have much to gain from targeting alpha individuals but also little to lose in the event that the coalition fails.
The general conclusions derived from our model are unlikely to apply to species with facultative and highly sophisticated coalitionary behavior that are able to flexibly and dynamically respond to the behaviour of others, such as many primates. However, our model does describe coalition formation in the growing number of species with lower cognitive capacities that have been observed to regularly form coalitions, including many species of birds and social carnivores (Bissonnette et al. 2014) . Indeed, there is mounting evidence to suggest that cognition is not as important as socioecology in determining whether a species will evolve to use coalitions (Bissonnette et al. 2014) . Based on our results, we expect that species incapable of sophisticated cognition are far more likely to form all-up and bridging rather than all-down coalitions. Our model calculates the influence of coalitionary behavior on an individual's lifetime fitness rather than the fitness that may be gained from separate stages of an individual's life cycle. Few studies (Kulik et al. 2012 ) have sought to understand the relationship between coalitions and lifetime fitness; that is, previous models do not account for the fact that individuals may adjust behavior based on their future reproductive success (Cant and Field 2001; Wolf et al. 2007) .
From its inception (Caplow 1956 ), theory regarding coalition formation has focused extensively on the effects of initial ranks and resource holding potential (RHP) distributions of a group on coalition formation (Mesterton-Gibbons et al. 2011 ) with few exceptions (Broom et al. 2009 ), yet empirical studies have regularly demonstrated across species that coalition partners are often selected based on features related to but distinct from RHP such as kinship (Silk 1992; Engh et al. 2000; Kapsalis 2004; Chapais 2006) , sex (Kaplan 1977) , and age (Mitani et al. 2002; de Villiers et al. 2003) .The call for models to delineate the relationship between coalitionary behavior and life-history characteristics would require a class-structure analogue of the model provided here. Each distinct class would then require a separate set of phenotypes controlling for behavior in each distinct group structure. Unfortunately, such a model is unlikely to be numerically, much less analytically, tractable; agent-based models are likely to be more profitable for this endeavor. Agent-based modeling has been previously used to investigate coalitionary behavior, but these models focused on how individual differences in RHP rather than pertinent life-history traits may affect coalitionary behavior (Gavrilets et al. 2008) . We would like to thank the two reviewers for their very useful comments, and David Dick for his helpful suggestions and discussions.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Data accessibility: Analyses reported in this article can be reproduced using the data generated from Koykka and Wild (2016) .
Handling editor: Louise Barrett
APPENDIX
Complete fitness calculation
To calculate the selection gradient acting on each phenotype, we first derive the future reproductive success associated with each state. We define W i as the future reproductive success for an individual in state i (e.g., W 6 represents the residual fitness of a gamma in a trio that has formed an alpha-gamma coalition). Let (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ))
(1 )(1 ) ) (1 ) 2,3 3,2
